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Abstract 
The Kyoto Protocol represents the first international agreement to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. Proposed mitigation efforts may involve the agricultural sector through 
such options as planting trees, crop and livestock management changes, and biofuels 
production. The combined use of these strategies could substantially reduce net emissions 
of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. However, countries where the Protocol 
imposes emissions caps have expressed concern about their competitiveness with 
countries that are not part of the Kyoto Protocol. In a free-trade arena, food production 
and exports in unregulated countries could increase and reduce market share for the 
producers in complying countries. 
We examine the effects of differential Protocol treatments on agricultural food 
production and on international trade of agricultural commodities modeling under the 
assumption that the average U.S. compliance-caused cost increase would also occur in 
other complying countries. The three cases considered are (1) unilateral U.S. 
implementation, (2) unilateral Annex I country implementation, and (3) global 
implementation. The results, which are only suggestive of the types of effects that would 
be observed due to the simplifying cost assumptions, indicate compliance causes supply 
cutbacks in regulated countries and supply increases in nonregulated countries. In 
addition, the study results show that U.S. agricultural producers are likely to benefit from 
a Kyoto Protocol–like environment, but consumers are likely to be hurt in terms of their 
agricultural welfare 
 
Key words:  Agricultural Sector Model, crop exports, food production, greenhouse gas 
emission mitigation, international trade, Kyoto Protocol, leakage.
  
EFFECTS OF AGRICULTURAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION 
MITIGATION POLICIES: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Introduction 
Society has increasingly become concerned with the emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHG), the resultant atmospheric GHG concentrations, and their potential effects on 
climate. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects that GHG 
concentrations will cause global mean temperatures to rise by about 0.3 degree Celsius 
per decade (Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephramus). Such warming in turn is predicted to 
raise the sea level, to change the habitat boundaries for many plants and animals, and to 
induce other changes (Cole et al.). The Kyoto Protocol represents the first international 
agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Proposed mitigation efforts may involve 
the agricultural sector through such options as planting trees, crop and livestock 
management changes, and biofuels production (McCarl and Schneider). The combined 
use of these strategies could substantially reduce net emissions of carbon dioxide, 
methane, and nitrous oxide. 
Because effects of GHG emission (GHGE) reductions are global, all countries will 
share the benefits from GHGE mitigation efforts, but only the countries adopting the 
mitigation policies will bear the brunt of the costs. Producers within countries adopting 
agricultural GHGE mitigation strategies are likely to experience increased production 
costs. Non-implementing countries, therefore, may gain advantage and the market share 
of production from implementing and non-implementing countries may change. This has 
been a concern of many in the potentially affected countries. For example, the U.S. Farm 
Bureau Federation advances a position that it will oppose ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol (KP) because principal competitor countries in international agricultural markets 
are not constrained by the terms of the Protocol (Francl, Nadler, and Bast).  
This document reports on a study which conducted a first-order examination of the 
international trade impacts of differential KP-like implementation across countries. 
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Specifically, we examine trade and U.S. agricultural sector implications under (1) 
unilateral U.S. implementation, (2) unilateral U.S. and all other Annex I1 country 
implementation, and (3) global implementation. The global implementation scenario 
would arise under a perfect implementation of the Joint Implementation mechanism in 
the KP Article 6, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of Article 12, and the 
international trading mechanisms in Article 17. 
 
A Graphic Economic Analysis of GHGE Reduction Implementation 
In this section we investigate two different international implementation and trading 
situations involved with GHGE mitigation policy implementation. The first case considers 
the impacts of unilateral GHGE mitigation implementation in just one group of, say, Annex 
I, countries. Second, we will assume a global implementation of GHGE mitigation policies 
in the agricultural sector for all countries.  
Unilateral GHGE Mitigation Implementation 
Suppose Annex I countries are net exporters. Let S, D, ES, ED represent the aggregate 
domestic supply, domestic demand, excess supply, and excess demand curves of Annex I 
countries, respectively (Figure 1, Panel A). Similarly, let RS and RD represent the non-
Annex I countries’ aggregated excess supply and demand curves. The trade equilibrium 
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries occurs at E0, where the Annex I countries’ 
excess supply curve intersects the non-Annex I countries’ excess demand curve. At this 
point, Annex I countries’ exports equal the sum of imports into non-annex I countries Q0.  
If Annex I countries alone ratify the KP, their domestic and excess supply curve 
would move upwards (from S0 to S1 and from ES0 to ES1), reflecting higher cost of 
domestic production. The new equilibrium would be at E1, yielding lower levels of 
Annex I countries’ domestic production and exports and a higher price. Non-Annex I 
countries would increase their aggregate food production (from QR0 to QR1). Assuming 
that emissions are proportional to food production intensity, emissions will decrease in 
Annex I countries but will increase in non-Annex I countries. The effect on global 
GHGE, however, is ambiguous depending on elasticities of involved supply and 
demand curves.  
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FIGURE 1. Effects of agricultural mitigation policies on trade 
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Worldwide GHGE Mitigation Implementation 
In this scenario, supply curves for traditional agricultural products shift left both in 
Annex I and non-Annex I countries (Figure 1, Panels B, C). As a result, the equilibrium 
price in the world market would increase. We can expect total production as well as 
global GHGE would decrease. The impact of a global mitigation policy on individual 
countries depends on the country-specific link between food production and GHGE. If 
mitigation policies induce substantial supply shifts in some countries but only small shifts 
in others, production may increase in the latter countries. Overall, global implementation 
of GHGE mitigation policies is likely to smooth the cost of emission reduction.  
 
Model Description 
We will use a model to evaluate the empirical magnitude of alternative levels of 
GHG emission trading. In particular, the detailed greenhouse gas version of the U.S. 
Agricultural Sector Model (ASM) developed by Schneider is used. This model arose 
from the base ASM as described in Chang et al. and McCarl et al. with the addition of 
details on soil types (developed in conjunction with USDA-NRCS) and a trade 
representation via spatial equilibrium models for eight commodities as developed by 
Chen and Chen and McCarl. The combined model, hereafter called ASMGHG, considers 
agricultural production, consumption, and trade in developed and developing countries 
simultaneously. Overall characteristics of the model are discussed next.  
U.S. Agricultural Sector Model  
Like many agricultural sector models, ASMGHG is set up as price-endogenous 
mathematical program, following the market equilibrium and welfare optimization concept 
developed in Samuelson and in Takayama and Judge. ASMGHG simulates the competitive 
equilibrium in the agricultural commodity markets as well as in key input markets. Demand 
for commodities and supply for farming inputs are aggregated for each of 63 regions in the 
United States and for 28 foreign countries. Exports and imports are modeled in ASMGHG 
via excess supply and demand curves or a spatial equilibrium model, depending on 
commodity. Specifically, spatial equilibrium trade components are explicitly included for 
corn, sorghum, soybeans, rice, and four types of wheat (hard red spring and winter wheat, 
soft wheat, and hard wheat). Data on currently observed trade quantities, prices, 
transportation costs, and supply and demand elasticities were obtained from Fellin and 
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Fuller (1997, 1998), USDA statistical sources (USDA-NASS, USDA 1994a,b,c), and the 
USDA SWOPSIM model (Roningen, Sullivan, and Dixit).  
Modeling Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Strategies  
The original ASM model did not contain greenhouse gas emission components; 
Schneider added such a component. The component introduces choice variables and/or 
GHG net emission accounting to consider changes in crop mix, tillage, irrigation, 
fertilization, afforestation, biofuel production, and livestock management. Livestock 
management options involve (1) herd size, (2) methane reduction strategies including 
liquid manure system alterations on dairy and hog farms, and (3) enteric fermentation 
management involving use of growth hormones for dairy cows. A detailed description of 
all considered mitigation strategies and data sources is contained in Schneider. ASMGHG 
contains emission accounting equations, which add up  
· direct carbon emissions from fossil fuel use (diesel, gasoline, natural gas, heating 
oil, LP gas) in tillage, harvesting, or irrigation water pumping as well as altered 
soil organic matter (cultivation of forested lands or grasslands);  
· indirect carbon emissions from manufacture of fossil fuel intensive inputs 
(fertilizers, pesticides);  
· carbon savings from increases in soil organic matter (reduced tillage intensity, 
conversion of arable land to grassland and from tree planting);  
· carbon offsets from biofuel production (ethanol, power plant feedstock via 
production of switchgrass, poplar, and willow);  
· nitrous oxide emissions from fertilizer usage and livestock manure;  
· methane emissions from enteric fermentation, livestock manure, and rice 
cultivation; 
· methane savings from manure management changes, and methane and nitrous 
oxide emission changes from biomass power plants.  
Individual emissions and emission reductions were converted to carbon equivalent 
measures using global warming potential from the IPCC (21 for methane and 310 for 
nitrous oxide).  
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Experimental Results and Implications  
Three alternative policy implementation scenarios were run to examine the impacts 
of the scope of international GHGE mitigation efforts. The first scenario assumes 
mitigation efforts in U.S. agriculture only. The second corresponds to a KP-like situation 
with agricultural provisions applying to all Annex I countries. The third involves 
worldwide implementation. All three scenarios were analyzed for alternative CE-prices 
ranging from $0 to $500 per ton. Major results are illustrated for CE-prices up to $100 
per ton. In addition, we tabulated scenario results corresponding to price levels of $20, 
$100, and $400 per ton of carbon equivalent.  
Unilateral Implementation in the United States Alone 
U.S. agricultural sector effects of a unilateral U.S. emission policy implementation 
over a range of CE-prices are listed in Table 1 and shown in Figures 2–6. The effects on 
U.S. agricultural GHGE by gas category are summarized in Figure 2. Total CE-
equivalent emissions decline steadily as the CE-price rises. At $100 per ton, net 
emissions of CE from U.S. agriculture are about zero. Net emissions of carbon dioxide 
are negative for CE-prices beyond $55 per ton. At $100, the realized levels of carbon 
sequestration from carbon sinks offset agricultural emissions of methane and nitrous 
oxide. As Table 2 shows, net emission values from agriculture can be substantially 
negative if CE-prices are extremely high; i.e., a CE-price of $400 per ton yields annual 
net emission of -168 million metric tons (mmt). 
Figure 3 shows the effects in the United States of increasing CE-prices on domestic 
agricultural production, prices, and exports for major trading crops under the unilateral 
implementation. All indices show the percentage changes from a zero-carbon-price base 
situation corresponding to no action on the greenhouse gas emission reduction front. 
Comparison of Figure 2 and Figure 3 confirms our assumption that emission reductions 
are obtained at the expense of conventional crop production. Increasing CE-prices cause 
decreases in U.S. production and exports along with increases in prices. In addition, 
because the United States is a major world agricultural trading country, it influences 
production in other countries. As shown in Table 1 and Figure 4, U.S. unilateral CE-
prices lead to expanded world production and exports in both Annex I (U.S. not included) 
and non-Annex I countries.  
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TABLE 1. Results on Fisher Ideal Price and Quantity Indices of production, price, 
and trade at different carbon equivalent prices for greenhouse gas emissions 
Mitigation Policy in 
USA Only Annex I Countries All Countries 
 
$20 $100 $400 $20 $100 $400 $20 $100 $400 
 U.S. 
Trading crops  
  production 
99.09 93.47 66.20 99.64 97.09 88.84 100.59 105.11 114.91 
All production 99.04 97.53 96.34 99.16 97.43 97.00 99.32 98.59 95.70 
Trading crops  
  prices 
101.18 112.06 226.40 102.08 120.72 357.31 103.65 140.35 635.79 
Overall agricultural 
  product prices 
101.42 110.60 196.32 101.82 113.44 225.04 102.28 121.68 307.17 
Exports 97.44 81.77 18.84 99.50 97.65 104.13 103.28 126.92 203.97 
 All Countries Except U.S. 
Exports 100.83 107.95 145.25 100.66 106.64 143.73 96.58 78.34 68.83 
Imports 99.24 95.88 85.94 100.23 105.65 142.17 100.56 105.59 145.06 
Prices 101.06 107.94 148.68 102.44 123.02 408.12 104.83 154.08 889.01 
 Annex I Countries (excluding U.S.) 
Exports 100.69 102.66 113.00 98.81 92.31 80.19 99.94 99.25 89.37 
Imports 99.32 95.86 85.55 102.84 128.95 269.59 101.73 111.48 155.95 
Prices 101.20 109.21 156.57 103.00 128.20 487.18 105.44 161.80 1008.84 
 Non-Annex I Countries 
Exports 100.93 112.22 174.45 102.15 120.13 261.04 93.85 57.60 38.13 
Imports 99.19 95.89 86.22 98.43 89.71 58.90 99.76 101.68 138.88 
Prices 100.95 107.04 143.28 102.03 118.96 332.63 104.39 148.11 796.69 
Note: Trading crops production includes the production for corn, soybeans, sorghum, rice, and four kinds of wheat defined 
previously; all production includes production for all primary products (crops and livestock) defined in the model. 
 
 
The impacts of GHGE mitigation efforts on agriculture sector welfare are listed in 
Table 2 and illustrated in Figures 5-6. While U.S. consumers’ surplus decreases 
monotonically with CE-price increases, producers’ net surplus decreases only for low 
CE-price levels but increases for CE-prices above $55 per ton. Producers’ net surplus 
arises from two sources: traditional production activities and CE-price-induced GHG 
payments/charges. In a U.S.-only implementation, producers always gain in the 
production account due to commodity price increases, which more than offset 
production declines. The effects on the total CE GHGE account depend on the 
magnitude of carbon prices. For prices below $100 per ton, emission charges exceed 
sequestration payments. However, if carbon prices exceed $100, net GHGE payments 
to farmers become positive (Table 2). 
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TABLE 2. Impacts of mitigation policies on agricultural sector welfare (million 
dollars) and U.S. emissions (mmt) at different carbon equivalent prices 
 Mitigation Policy in 
 USA Only Annex I Countries All Countries 
 $20 $100 $400 $20 $100 $400 $20 $100 $400 
U.S. consumers’ 
surplus 
-1,240 
(-0.10) 
-9,159 
(-0.77) 
-66,818 
(-5.65) 
-1,536 
(-0.13) 
-11,355 
(-0.96) 
-79,193 
(-6.69) 
-1,976 
(-0.17) 
-17,607 
(-1.49) 
-117,011 
(-9.89) 
U.S. producers’ 
surplus 
-161.70 
(-0.36) 
7,430 
(16.35) 
121,252 
(266.82) 
449 
(0.99) 
13,037 
(28.69) 
197,108 
(433.74) 
1,479 
(3.26) 
27,336 
(60.15) 
391,136 
(860.71) 
Producers’ surplus 
related to 
agricultural 
production 
1,353 
(2.98) 
7,689 
(16.92) 
54,085 
(119.02) 
1,976 
(4.35) 
14,380 
(31.64) 
155,475 
(342.13) 
3,024 
(6.65) 
30,037 
(66.10) 
396,125 
(871.69) 
Gross total welfare 
in U.S. agricul-
tural sector  
113 
(0.01) 
-1,471 
(-0.12) 
-12,732 
(-1.04) 
440 
(0.04) 
3,025 
(0.25) 
76,282 
(6.21) 
1,048 
(0.09) 
12,430 
(1.01) 
279,120 
(22.71) 
GHG charges/ 
payments 
-1,514 -259 67,167 -1,526 -1,342 41,633 -1,545 -2,701 -4,989 
Net total welfare 
in U.S. agricul-
tural sector 
-1,402 
(-0.11) 
-1,730 
(-0.14) 
54,435 
(4.43) 
-1,087 
(-0.09) 
1,683 
(0.14) 
117,915 
(9.59) 
-497 
(-0.04) 
9,728 
(0.79) 
274,125 
(22.31) 
Foreign countries’ 
agricultural 
trade surplus 
-395 
(-0.16) 
-3,516 
(-1.45) 
-27,546 
(-11.39) 
2,140 
(0.89) 
17,902 
(7.40) 
392,761 
(62.45) 
5,360 
(2.22) 
42,156 
(17.44) 
213,136 
(88.16) 
Gross total 
agricultural 
welfare 
-282 
(-0.02) 
-4,986 
(-0.34) 
-40,278 
(-2.74) 
2,579 
(0.18) 
20,928 
(1.42) 
227,276 
(15.45) 
6,408 
(0.44) 
54,586 
(3.71) 
492,249 
(33.47) 
Net total 
agricultural 
welfare 
-1,796 
(-0.12) 
-5,245 
(-0.36) 
26,889 
(1.83) 
1,053 
(0.07) 
19,585 
(1.33) 
268,909 
(18.28) 
4,863 
(0.33) 
51,884 
(3.53) 
487,260 
(33.13) 
U.S. agricultural 
GHG emissions 
76.74 2.58 -167.92 76.32 13.40 -104.08 77.23 27.01 12.47 
U.S. agricultural 
GHG emission 
reductions 
-27.89 
(-26.92) 
-101.05 
(-97.50) 
-271.55 
(-262.03) 
-27.32 
(-26.36) 
-90.21 
(-87.05) 
-207.72 
(-200.43) 
-26.40 
(-25.48) 
-79.62 
(-73.93) 
-91.16 
(-87.97) 
 
 
Total welfare effects from a unilateral implementation in the United States are 
summarized in Figure 6. U.S. agricultural surplus represents the sum of U.S. consumers’ 
and producers’ surplus. Up to a CE-price of about $60 per ton, total U.S. agricultural 
welfare decreases. Beyond $60, this trend is reversed and total welfare in the United 
States increases at the expense of welfare in foreign countries. Trade surplus measures 
the welfare of consumers and producers in non-U.S. countries attributable to trade of  
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FIGURE 2. Carbon equivalent prices and emissions of greenhouse gas components 
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FIGURE 3. Carbon equivalent prices and production, prices, and exports of trading 
crops as measured by the Fisher Index (unilateral implementation in the U.S. only) 
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FIGURE 4. Carbon equivalent prices and foreign countries’ trade activities as 
measured by the Fisher Index (unilateral implementation in the U.S. only) 
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FIGURE 5. Carbon equivalent prices and welfare changes in the U.S. agricultural 
sector (unilateral implementation in the U.S. only) 
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FIGURE 6. Carbon equivalent prices and total welfare changes in the agricultural 
sector (unilateral implementation in the U.S. only) 
 
agricultural commodities. If the United States alone implements agricultural provisions 
for mitigation, the impact on welfare in other countries is negative, with the magnitude 
getting bigger as the CE price increases. Consumer losses in non-U.S. countries exceed 
producer gains. 
Modeling Mitigation-Induced Shifts in ROW Countries  
Mitigation efforts in agricultural sectors outside the United States could not be 
modeled explicitly because we did not have detailed modeling of production activities in 
foreign regions, but we had information on supply curves for major trading crops. Thus, a 
simplifying assumption was made to depict the supply shifts in foreign countries. 
Namely, the average price increase and production decrease observed in U.S. production 
was assumed to apply proportionally to the production in the foreign countries. Thus, 
under a particular CE-price, if average U.S. prices went up by a percent and production 
went down by b percent, the same shift was applied to foreign supply curves for all 
commodities in the implementing countries. This is clearly a crude approximation of 
what would happen, but we felt that alternative reasonable assumptions were not 
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available. Empirical results derived from supply shifts in developing countries should 
therefore be considered illustrative but not definitive. In presenting our empirical results 
we will focus on a comparison between the various implementation scenarios examined. 
Full Annex I Implementation 
The results for the full Annex I countries implementation are shown in Table 1 and 
Figures 7-16. In terms of U.S. agriculture, these results are somewhat similar to those under 
the unilateral U.S. implementation. U.S. production (Figure 7) and exports (Figure 8) 
decline; however, the rate of change is noticeably lower, particularly for CE-prices above 
$60 per ton. This diminished response reflects the fact that only the non-Annex I countries 
now have comparative advantage over U.S. agriculture as their costs have not been 
influenced. Prices of traded agricultural commodities increase slightly more under full 
Annex I implementation (Figure 9). The welfare results shift, with U.S. producers always 
gaining and consumers losing even more than under unilateral implementation (Figure 10). 
Overall, U.S. welfare falls less under this more global implementation (Figure 11). 
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FIGURE 7. Carbon equivalent prices and U.S. domestic production of trading crops 
as measured by the Fisher Index 
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FIGURE 8. Carbon equivalent prices and U.S. exports of trading crops as measured 
by the Fisher Index 
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FIGURE 9. Carbon equivalent prices and U.S. prices for trading crops as measured 
by the Fisher Index 
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FIGURE 10. Carbon equivalent prices and welfare changes to U.S. consumers and 
U.S. producers 
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FIGURE 11. Carbon equivalent prices and net welfare changes in the U.S. 
agricultural sector  
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In Figures 12-15, non-U.S. countries’ trade activities are displayed. Annex I 
countries’ net exports are highest under U.S. unilateral implementation but lowest if all 
Annex I countries are subjected to agricultural mitigation policies (Figures 12-13). 
Equivalently, non-Annex I countries’ net exports are highest under full Annex I country 
implementation (Figure 14-15). All of these observed changes become more substantial 
the more the CE-price increases. Note that to avoid double counting, the Annex I 
accounts displayed in all figures do not include the United States.  
Total emissions reductions from U.S. agriculture are almost identical up to the CE-
prices of $55 per ton (Figure 16). Above $85 per ton of CE, additional emissions 
reductions become visibly smaller under full Annex I country implementation. For 
example, at a CE-price of $100 per ton, emissions reductions are about 11 percent lower 
than for implementation of United States alone. U.S. emissions rise because higher 
commodity prices lead to more intensive production and less adoption of sequestration 
and emission control activities. This would be offset by emissions reductions in the 
Annex I agriculture. However, we cannot account for that fact as we do not have 
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FIGURE 12. Carbon equivalent prices and crop exports by Annex I countries as 
measured by the Fisher Index 
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FIGURE 13. Carbon equivalent prices and crop imports by Annex I countries as 
measured by the Fisher Index 
 
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
0 20 40 60 80 100
Fi
sh
er
 Id
ea
l I
nd
ex
 
Carbon Equivalent (CE) Prices in Dollars per Ton 
Mitigation Policy in: 
USA
Annex I countries
All countries
 
FIGURE 14. Carbon equivalent prices and crop exports by non-Annex I countries as 
measured by the Fisher Index 
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FIGURE 15. Carbon equivalent prices and crop imports by non-Annex I countries   
as measured by the Fisher Index 
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FIGURE 16. Carbon equivalent prices and net carbon emissions from U.S. 
agriculture 
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emissions modeled in those countries and extrapolation of U.S. rates would involve even 
more heroic assumptions than we are now making. 
Global GHGE Mitigation Implementation 
Provisions in the Kyoto Protocol permit emissions offset where GHGE emission 
reductions from projects in non-Annex I countries may be counted as part of the emission 
reduction obligation for project sponsors in Annex I countries. In such circumstances, 
low-cost activities in agriculture can be exploited globally. Thus, in the last scenario we 
examine a case where production is shifted globally using the U.S. average price and cost 
shift assumptions as explained above. Tables 1-2 list the main impacts. We find an 
increasing world market share for the United States at the expense of foreign countries, 
particularly the non-Annex I ones. Prices rise more than in the unilateral case (Figure 9). 
Note that this is a property of the assumptions, as we have shifted successively more and 
more of the supply curves.  
On the welfare side, U.S. producers benefit even more from such a situation but 
consumers lose even more (Figure 10). In terms of emissions, the more countries that 
implement GHGE mitigation policies, the smaller are the net emission reductions from 
U.S. agriculture (Figure 16). For example, at a CE-price of $100 per ton, emissions 
offsets are about 21 percent lower than for U.S. unilateral implementation. 
 
Conclusions 
The prospect of greenhouse gas emission mitigation policies has stimulated a wide 
search for cost-efficient emission reduction methods. Agriculture, including forestry, has 
been proposed as a relatively cheap source of net emission reductions. However, 
concerns have been expressed about agricultural abatement policies being hosted in only 
a subset of all countries. The comparative advantage gained in the agricultural sectors of 
non-host countries could distort trade patterns, harm domestic agricultural producers in 
host countries, and lead to increased emissions in non-host countries. In the U.S. 
agricultural sector, our results confirm trade-offs between agricultural emission 
reductions and traditional food and fiber production. In particular, the two most carbon-
abating strategies, afforestation and production of biofuels, cause the greatest decline in 
traditional agricultural production. If the positive relationship between agricultural 
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production and agricultural emissions also holds in foreign countries, then our results 
imply increased greenhouse gas emissions in non-host countries. However, the 
consequences of such emission leakage would not necessarily be incurred by non-host 
countries but by those countries which are most vulnerable to climate change.  
The findings of this paper have several implications for policy makers. First, if 
national agricultural greenhouse gas mitigation policies are not synchronized with foreign 
greenhouse gas emission policies, substantial leakage may occur. For example, if an 
international treaty like the Kyoto Protocol were implemented, emission reductions in 
Annex I countries most likely would be accompanied by emission increases in non-
Annex I (developing) countries. Several alternatives exist to prevent emissions increases 
through agriculture in non-host countries. For example, the Kyoto Protocol proposes 
Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanisms. Through such mechanisms, 
host countries could establish incentives for agricultural producers in non-host countries 
to adopt technologies that do not increase emissions. 
Second, U.S. farmers would benefit from a larger number of countries hosting 
greenhouse gas emission mitigation policies. Increasing the number of countries that 
abate greenhouse gases through the agricultural sector would lead to higher agricultural 
commodity prices. Income support has been a longtime objective of American farm bills. 
If the United States and other potential host countries would support financially a Clean 
Development Mechanism in non-host countries, i.e., Annex I countries, a portion of that 
expenditure could return, because higher agricultural prices eliminate the need for 
expensive farm bills.  
Third, if implementation of an equivalent mitigation policy or Clean Development 
Mechanism in all countries is politically infeasible, trade policies could be established to 
protect producers in host countries from unfair international competition. For example, 
import tariffs, quotas, or export subsidies could be used to limit or offset the comparative 
advantage of agricultural producers in non-host countries. Note that value-based trade 
restrictions, which do not discriminate among agricultural products with different 
emission levels, would encourage non-host countries to produce emission-intensive 
commodities. 
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Fourth, credits for agricultural emission abatement could be discounted to reflect 
likely emission leakage through agricultural sectors in non-host countries. This 
adjustment would imply higher discount factors for agricultural mitigation strategies that 
divert farmland, such as afforestation and biofuel production. However, strategies that are 
complementary to traditional food and fiber production, such as reduced tillage, would 
remain eligible for full credit. A differential treatment of agricultural mitigation strategies 
would then increase the relative adoption of complementary strategies and thus reduce 
leakage. 
Fifth, consumers of agricultural products incur higher expenses due to price 
increases. The more countries participate in mitigation efforts, the higher are the losses to 
both domestic and foreign consumers. Consequently, more people may become 
dependant on governmental aid to ensure sufficient food consumption.  
Quantitative effects presented in this study reflect several simplifying assumptions 
and uncertain data, and therefore should be considered preliminary. While efforts will 
continue to improve the underlying data, the basic nature of our findings is unlikely to 
change.
  
Endnote 
1.  According to the definition in the Kyoto Protocol, the “Party included in Annex I” refers to a party included in 
Annex I to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, as may be amended, or to a party 
which has made a notification under Article 4, paragraph 2(g), of this convention.
  
Appendix 
Review of the Spatial Equilibrium Version of the  
U.S. Agricultural Sector Model (ASMSE) 
Details on the Mathematical Structure of ASMSE 
The objective function is a blending of the spatial equilibrium and price endogenous sector models. In 
particular, the first two lines include typical terms in conventional sector models with farm programs, 
containing terms giving the area under the demand equations (òj(Qi) d Qi for commodity i less the area 
under the regional (k), U.S. factor supply curves for perfectly elastic production costs associated with 
production process j (CijkXijk), and quantity-dependent (òb(Lk)dLk and òa(Rrk)dRrk) prices for land L and 
factor r. The next four lines pertain to the spatial equilibrium model, with line three counting the area under 
the rest-of-world (ROW) excess demand curves minus the area under the excess supply curve for the 
commodity in the ROW. Line four sums the transportation costs between the U.S. regions and the foreign 
regions for U.S. imports and exports (USFTRD). Line five calculates the transportation costs among the 
foreign regions (FTRD). Line six represents the transportation costs between regions in the United States 
(USTRAN). Line seven introduces goods movements from the U.S. regions to the national demand at 
historic price differences.  
Objective Function in ASMSE. 
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where 
i indexes commodities, 
j indexes production processes, 
k, l indexes U.S. regions, 
c, d indexes ROW regions, 
r indexes resources, 
Lk denotes land usage in region k, 
Qi denotes consumption of ith product, 
FQDic   denotes excess demand quantity in 
ROW region c for commodity i, 
FQSic   denotes excess supply quantity in 
ROW region c for commodity i, 
RQic denotes commodity I consumption 
in ROW region c, 
Rrk denotes resource supply for U.S. 
region k of resource r, 
j (Qi)   denotes inverse U.S. demand 
function for commodity i con-
sumed, 
a (Rrk)  denotes inverse U.S. factor supply 
function for resource r in region k, 
b (Lk)  denotes inverse U.S. land supply 
function in region k, 
ED(FQDic)   denotes inverse excess demand 
function in importing ROW region c, 
ES(FQSic)  denotes inverse excess supply 
function in exporting ROW region c, 
Cijk denotes commodity i cost in jth 
production process per acre in U.S. 
region k,  
Xijk denotes commodity I acreage 
in jth production process in 
U.S. region k,  
USFTRDick  denotes trade between ROW 
region c and U.S. region k of 
commodity i, 
USFCSTikc  denotes transportation cost 
from U.S. region k to ROW 
region c for commodity i, 
FTRDicd    denotes trade between ROW 
regions c and c1 of commodity i, 
FFCSTicd   denotes transportation cost 
from ROW regions c and c1 
for commodity i, 
USTRANikl denotes shipment between U.S. 
regions k1 and k of commodity i, 
USCSTikl  denotes transportation cost 
between U.S. regions k1 and k 
for commodity i, 
PDIFik    denotes price difference 
between U.S. region k and 
U.S. national market for com-
modity i, and 
TNik denotes U.S. national 
consumption of commodity i 
from U.S. region k. 
 
 
Equation (2) below illustrates the supply and demand balance for the traded farm program goods with 
detailed world trade modeling for U.S. regions. The first item in this equation represents regional 
nonparticipating farm program production and production in the United States that is participating but not 
eligible for payment (that which is above farm program yield). The other items in equation (2) are variables 
for the shipments among U.S. regions (USTRAN), between U.S. regions and foreign countries (USFTRD), 
and between regions and the national U.S. market (TN). 
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 Regional Balance for Traded Goods in the United States. 
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- ´ - -
+ + £
å å å
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 (2) 
where 
f  index trade commodities which is a subset of i, 
Yfjk   denotes commodity f per acre yield in jth production process in U.S. region k. 
 
National Balance for Traded Goods. 
 0 ,f kf
k
for all fQ TN- £å  (3) 
where aggregate demand (Q) is balanced with the quantities (TN) from the regions (k) by commodity (f).  
 
National Balance for Non-traded Goods in the United States. 
 0 ,h j k h j kh
k j
for all hQ Y X- ´ £å å  (4) 
where h is the index for non-trade commodities, which is a subset of i. 
 
Regional Land Constraint in the United States. 
 ,i j k k
i j
for all kX L£å å . (5) 
 
Other Regional Resources Constraints in the United States. 
 , ,i j k r kr i j k
i j
for all r kf X R´ £å å  (6) 
where frijk denotes per acre resource r usage for commodity i in the jth production process in U.S. region k. 
Overall, equations (2) and (3) balance demands and supplies in regional and national markets for 
traded goods. Equation (4) is the U.S. national supply and demand balance constraint for non-trade and 
non-farm program goods. Equations (5) to (6) depict land and other resources constraints for region k in the 
U.S. The land constraint is modified to satisfy the set-aside requirement for deficiency payment. 
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Country Balance for Traded Goods. 
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 (7)  
where foreign region demand (FDQ), exports to the U.S. (USFTRD), and exports to the rest of the world 
(FTRD) are balanced against foreign region supply (FDS), imports from the U.S. (USFTRD), and imports 
from the rest of the world (FTRD).
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